When BMW bought the Rover Group – as it was then called – in the early 90s, the company was already struggling with productivity and rapidly declining market share. The only question that is yet to be answered is how it was allowed to get this way, after government and trade unions interfered on behalf of workers supposedly to ensure there would be no job losses. It is clear that towards the end MG Rover was a company rotten to the core and totally bankrupt. This final ruling is unlikely to bring solace to the embattled former employees, and if anything only serves to shift some of the blame from the shoulders of the four businessmen known as the Phoenix Four.Ī report published in the wake of the closures that investigated the collapse of the once-powerful company uncovered evidence of bribery, sophisticated tax-avoidance schemes, and the use of evidence elimination software. It later emerged that the funds had been misallocated and the loan had to be written off.Īs MG Rover collapsed, the Phoenix Four had enriched themselves and their families and despite bowing out of the business in utter ignominy, have retired to a life of comfort after sharing the spoils obtained from their failed venture.
#Long road to ruin free#
The Transport and General Workers Union, and the British general public also supported Phoenix’s offer to BMW, because it promised to secure jobs through the acquisition process and as the company was restructured.īecause of UK regulations that ensure that former owners can be held accountable for possible bankruptcies that might occur within the first three years after a sale, BMW paid Phoenix £500m, as an interest free loan, to get the company back on its feet. The Phoenix Four, as they became known, struck a deal with BMW after government interference in their favour. The consortium was founded with the express view of acquiring MG Rover from BMW in 2000, as the German manufacturer sought to rid itself of the loss-making manufacturer. The legend of the Phoenix The ‘Phoenix Four’ promised many improvements when they took over Rover MG – unfortunately few were deliveredĪlso known as Phoenix Venture Holdings, the Phoenix Consortium was comprised of four businessmen – John Towers, Peter Beale, Nick Stephenson, and John Edwards. Since MG Rover was sold off for scraps in 2005, leading to 6,000 workers losing their jobs and the exponential enrichment of its owners, there have been a number of public enquiries, which culminated last year with the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) fining Deloitte. After 20 years of mismanagement, and a whole eight years since the messy dismantling of what was once one of Britain’s finest manufacturing institutions, finally there was someone to blame – at least partially. When Deloitte was fined over £14m in 2013 over its involvement as accountants in the winding down of MG Rover, the cycle was complete. Top 5 ways to tackle innovation stress in the workplace.
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“Interest payments will already be millions of dollars more on private sector financing,” says Joy. The Nova Scotia Liberal government’s decision to protect the consortium hired to build the new P3 highway near Antigonish from extra debt-servicing costs due to COVID-19 has CUPE 1867 (Highways) President Steve Joy shaking his head.
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